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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of culture on important economic outcomes by using the 1970 Census to
examine the work and fertility behavior of women 30-40 years old, born in the U.S., but whose
parents were born elsewhere. We use past female labor force participation and total fertility
rates from the country of ancestry as our cultural proxies. These variables should capture,
in addition to past economic and institutional conditions, the beliefs commonly held about
the role of women in society, i.e. culture. Given the di¤erent time and place, only the beliefs
embodied in the cultural proxies should be potentially relevant to women’s behavior in the US
in 1970. We show that these cultural proxies have positive and signi…cant explanatory power
for individual work and fertility outcomes, even after controlling for possible indirect e¤ects of
culture (e.g., education and spousal characteristics). We examine alternative hypotheses for
these positive correlations and show that neither unobserved human capital nor networks are
likely to be responsible. We also show that the e¤ect of these cultural proxies is ampli…ed the
greater is the tendency for ethnic groups to cluster in the same neighborhoods.
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1. Introduction
As economists, we tend to study how individuals, with a given set of preferences and beliefs,
interact with economic incentives (provided mostly by markets) to produce outcomes. More
recently, we also emphasize the role of institutions, particularly in the longer run and at the
aggregate level.1 Thus, when we seek to explain variations in economic outcomes, we look pri-
marily at differences in components of individual or national budget sets (e.g., at variables such
as prices and incomes and at policies such as tax rates) and at differences in institutions (e.g.,
the extent of property protection or whether a political system is parliamentary or presidential).
This approach leaves out the possibility that preferences and beliefs themselves, broadly speaking,
have a systematic component that reflects past interactions of preferences, beliefs, markets, and
institutions. Variation in this systematic component—which we will call culture—therefore may
also be responsible for observed differences in outcomes.
With a few notable exceptions, the consequences of systematic differences in beliefs and
preferences have not been considered an appropriate topic for modern economic inquiry. In fact,
to attempt to explain differences in economic outcomes by appealing to differences in preferences
(and presumably beliefs) is often considered unscientific at best. As stated by Stigler and Becker
in their influential 1977 article “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum”:
We also claim, however, that no scientific behavior has been illuminated by as-
sumptions of differences in tastes. Instead, they along with assumptions of unstable
tastes, have been a convenient crutch to lean on when the analysis has bogged down.
They give the appearance of considered judgement, yet really have only been ad hoc
arguments that disguise analytical failures.
This approach, while sensible when variations in preferences and beliefs cannot be studied
in a rigorous fashion, is unnecessarily narrow if this variation is amenable to empirical analysis.2
1See Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2004) for the general thesis and a review of this literature. See also
Persson and Tabellini (2003).
2 It is unclear whether Stigler and Becker regarded their criticism as also applying to differences in beliefs which,
in a static framework, are indistinguishable from differences in preferences in their reduced form. Furthermore,
to be fair, it is quite likely that the authors would agree that culture can and should be studied. They would
interpret culture, however, as arising from a deeper level of preferences (e.g., from a preference to be similar to one’s
neighbors), or from costs in processing information that give rise to persistence in behavior even if the environment
changes. This is, in fact, how the authors think of habits or customs. We have no quarrel with this interpretation,
and in this sense we will not be trying to show that individuals differ in their “deeper” preferences, but rather in
their reduced-form appearance.
This paper seeks to address this deficiency by attempting to show that systematic variation in
preferences and beliefs (i.e., in culture) matters to important economic phenomena.
Culture is a rather hazy concept.3 Although developing a dynamic model of culture is beyond
the scope of this paper, it is useful to discuss some of the features of culture that are important
to our analysis. To be clear, we do not consider culture to be any more or less “primitive” than
markets or institutions. In our view, all three interact with one another over time and mutually
condition each other. Whether and how a market or institution operates, for example, may
depend on beliefs (e.g., on whether it is considered acceptable to buy and sell individuals as under
slavery, or whether women should count as full citizens and be allowed to vote in a “democracy”),
and these beliefs themselves change in response to the experiences afforded by the economy and
the interests it creates.
Beliefs are a fundamental component of culture. These include not simply religious beliefs,
which are not for the most part empirically verifiable, but also beliefs that may be, in principle,
testable. Take, for example, the belief that children are better off if their mother stays home
to take care of them. This is a question about which, even today, people hold very different
beliefs. These beliefs are not based necessarily on scientific studies, but experimenting to obtain
more information is quite costly for any individual woman, and the counterfactual—how her child
will turn out otherwise—is difficult to establish. Beliefs and preferences are transmitted across
generations by the family and by local society (e.g., schools, religious organizations, neighborhood
composition, etc.). Thus, culture tends to evolve slowly over time in society, but can also suddenly
shift as new information (e.g., new anecdotes or changes in neighborhood composition or media
availability) becomes more widely diffused.4 We will not, in any case, attempt to provide a
more abstract and rigorous definition of culture here, but rather attempt to identify, in individual
behavior, something that we can think of as beliefs or norms that operate in a systematic fashion.5
We choose to investigate the effect of culture on important economic decisions by studying
women’s work and fertility decisions. The focus on women is not accidental. Fertility and
women’s participation in the formal labor market vary widely across time and space. The
hypothesis that a significant part of this variation can be explained by different beliefs as to
3As defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary, culture is a) “the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief,
and behavior that depends upon man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations”;
b) “the customary beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group.”
4Empirically it is difficult to distinguish between beliefs, information, and preference transmission and we will
not attempt to do so.
5For a discussion of social norms (and some definitions) see, for example, Elster (1989).
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the appropriate role of women in society, i.e., by culture, as opposed to solely economic and
institutional variation, seems particularly apt in this context and the economic importance of
these decisions is incontrovertible.6
A challenge in the analysis of culture is to separate its effects from those due to markets
and institutions. One way around this problem is to study outcomes for women born in one
country (the United States, in our case) but whose parents were born in another country. It
can be argued that these women share similar markets and formal institutions but have possibly
different cultural heritages as reflected in their parents’ country of origin. Furthermore, rather
than use a dummy variable for the woman’s country of ancestry as a proxy for culture (which does
not make explicit why it matters to be of Mexican ancestry, say, relative to Swedish), we take past
labor force participation and fertility variables from the country of ancestry as our cultural proxies.
These variables should reflect, in addition to whatever economic and institutional conditions were
prevalent in the country at that time, the cultural beliefs that then reigned as to the appropriate
role for women in society. While the economic and institutional conditions should no longer be
relevant for the second-generation American women (as neither the country nor the time period is
the same), the beliefs embodied in these variables may still matter if parents and/or neighborhood
transmitted them to the next generation.
We use the 1970 census to study work and fertility outcomes for women and use 1950 values
of female labor force participation (LFP) and total fertility rates (TFR) in the country of ancestry
as the cultural proxies.7 We find that the cultural proxies are significant to both work and fertility
outcomes. In order to ensure that these results are not driven by parental characteristics that
differ in a systematic fashion by country of origin, we control as well for variables that themselves
are likely to be influenced by culture, such as a woman’s education, or the education and income
of her spouse.8 We also control for local geographic variation in markets and institutions by
including metropolitan standard area fixed effects, and we cluster observations at the country-of-
ancestry level. In all cases, we find that culture, as reflected in our proxy variables of LFP or
TFR in 1950, is a quantitatively and statistically significant determinant of women’s work and
6Pencavel’s (1998) study of women’s market work and wages from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, for example,
concludes that changes in wages can at most account for half of the observed change in work behavior across cohorts.
Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) present a model of endogenous preference evolution through family experience
and explore the role of these preferences in increasing female labor force participation. See Goldin (1990) for a
history of women and work in the US.
7Later decades of the census do not ask for the country of birth of a respondent’s parents, and 1950 is as far
back as one can go to obtain female LFP and TFR for a non-trivial number of countries.
8Our data set does not permit us to observe the financial and educational backgrounds of parents directly.
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fertility outcomes. A one standard deviation increase in LFP in 1950 is associated with about a
one-week increase in weeks worked per year (or about a 7.5% increase in hours worked) in 1970;
a one standard deviation increase in TFR in 1950 is associated with approximately 0.4 extra
children, a 14% increase in the number of children in 1970.9
The major concern our analysis needs to address is whether there exists some omitted variable
that is driving our results and that is unrelated to culture but correlated with LFP and TFR in
1950 in the country of ancestry. The main suspects for this role are unobserved human capital
or the “quality” of the networks available to these women. Unobserved human capital may
be a culprit if differences in parental education levels lead to differences in unobserved human
capital in ways not captured by the formal education level of their children. Alternatively, if the
human capital of one’s ethnic group is an important input in the formation of one’s own human
capital (as argued by Borjas [1992, 1995]), or if it is an input in the ethnic network that helps
individuals find employment, then systematic differences across ethnic groups may be responsible
for our results. We address these concerns in a few ways. We use the General Social Survey
(GSS) to control directly for the parent’s level of education and show that our results are robust
to these additional controls. We also construct measures of ethnic human capital by using the
1940 census to calculate the average education of immigrants by country of origin. This variable
should proxy both for parental human capital and for the human capital embodied in the ethnic
network available to the woman. We find that this variable is significant in explaining how much
women work (though not fertility), but the effect of the cultural proxy remains robust. We also
construct a similar measure of ethnic human capital for second-generation immigrants from the
same generation as our sample and obtain similar results.
Our most revealing test, however, is related to men. We show that our cultural proxies
are unable to explain men’s work behavior, though they have explanatory power for the number
of children men have. This is reassuring since, if female LFP in 1950 were able to positively
and significantly explain the work behavior of the male counterparts of our women (i.e., men
born in the US whose parents were born in a foreign country), this would cast serious doubts as
to whether the cultural variable was primarily capturing attitudes towards women rather than
some unobserved economic difference by country of ancestry. The fertility variable, on the other
hand, is able to capture cultural preferences towards family size which may be shared by men and
9We also used country dummies in our analysis. We show that our cultural proxies are able to explain a
significant portion of the variation in the coefficients of the country dummies.
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women.
The investigation of culture and men rather naturally leads us to examine a related question:
Whose culture is important in deciding a married woman’s work and fertility—her own or her
husband’s? We show that the cultural proxies of both spouses play an important role, though
perhaps surprisingly the husband’s culture seems to be more important in driving his wife’s work
outcomes.10 We also investigate whether variation across country of ancestry in the average
proportion of individuals from the same ancestry in a neighborhood matters for cultural trans-
mission. In particular, is the impact of culture larger for those groups that tend to cluster in
the same neighborhoods? We find that the answer is yes, strengthening our prior that culture is
transmitted both by family and by local society (e.g., neighborhood, schools, church, etc.).
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a brief review of the empirical
literature.11 Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and Section 4 our results. We examine
robustness to sample selection and estimation techniques in Section 5. Section 6 examines
competing explanations. Section 7 investigates whether it is a woman’s or her husband’s culture
that matters for her outcomes, and Section 8 studies the role of ethnic density in the neighborhood.
Section 9 concludes.
2. A Brief Literature Review
The idea that culture can influence economic outcomes is, of course, not a new one. Max
Weber’s celebrated thesis at the beginning of the 20th century argued that a specific culture—the
“Protestant ethic”—was conducive to capitalist accumulation.12 More recently, culture plays a
central role in Landes’ (1998) explanation for differences in economic growth across countries, and
Putnam (2000) stresses the role of trust, and more generally of “social capital,” in facilitating
economic exchange and efficient governance.13
There is little quantitative evidence, however, that demonstrates that culture is a significant
determinant of important economic outcomes. Not surprisingly, the relatively small literature
in this field has often focused either on immigrants or on individuals from different ethnic back-
10This evidence is also in line with Fernández, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004). They show that a quantitatively
important factor explaining whether a man’s wife works is whether his own mother worked when he was growing up.
This finding holds even after controlling for education, income, and other family background variables. Whether
his mother worked or not is probably influenced by her beliefs about women’s role, which may then have been
transmitted to her son and thus influenced any household bargaining/decision affecting his wife’s work outcome.
11See Bisin and Verdier (2000) for a model of the family and endogenous cultural transmission and Cole, Mailath,
and Postlewaite (1992) for a model of endogenous social norms and how these affect savings and growth.
12More recently, Barro and McCleary (2003) examine the effect of religion on economic growth.
13See Weil’s (2004) very nice chapter that reviews the research on culture and growth.
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grounds to investigate the effect of culture. Using ethnic dummy variables, Reimers (1985) is
an early attempt to examine the role of ethnicity in married women’s labor force participation
in the US. She finds mixed evidence in favor of ethnic background mattering, which perhaps is
not surprising given that ethnic groups vary substantially in the length of time they have been in
the US. Employing a similar strategy, but focusing solely on immigrants which allows them to
ensure a greater degree of homogeneity, Carroll, Rhee, and Rhee (1994) examine whether culture
can help explain different savings rates by comparing saving patterns of immigrants to Canada.
They find no evidence of cultural effects on savings. Their analysis, however, faces important
data limitations: they control only for broad regions of origin and they do not have data on
individual wealth.
Giuliano (2004) and Antecol (2000) both use quantitative home-country variables to study
the effect of culture. Giuliano attempts to show that Western European second-generation
immigrants to the US tend to replicate the family living arrangements of their country of origin.
Her main thesis is that the sexual revolution interacted with different family models in the early
1970s to increase the proportion of individuals who live at home in Southern European countries
but not in Northern ones, and that this differential pattern of behavior is reflected in the behavior
of second-generation individuals in the US. Giuliano shows that individuals of Southern European
ancestry tend to have a higher probability of living at home in the US.
Antecol (2000) studies the effect of male and female LFP in the country of ancestry on
the inter-ethnic gender gap in labor force participation rates in the US.14 For first-generation
immigrants, labor force participation in the US increases for women and decreases for men as a
function of female LFP in the home country.15 For second-and-higher generation immigrants,
the total effect of female LFP appears to be positive for both men and women. These results
are interesting, but why culture should produce this pattern is unclear and alternative hypotheses
(e.g., other country characteristics) are not examined. Furthermore, the focus on first-generation
immigrants leaves open the reasonable possibility that these results are the product of systematic
economic differences across countries of origin. The analysis of second-and-higher generation
immigrants is also problematic since the data set does not permit one to identify the exact
generation, and hence some families may have been in the country for many generations whereas
others may be second generation. Our analysis, by using the 1970 census and focusing exclusively
14Antecol (2001) conducts a similar study for the gender wage gap.
15The results with respect to male LFP are not reported.
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on second-generation immigrants, avoids both sets of problems.
In addition to the above studies focusing on immigrants, there has also been work using
measures of attitudes towards women’s role within a country. Levine (1993), for example, finds
that attitudes, as reflected in responses to GSS questions, are an important predictor of whether
any particular woman works in a given year, but that the attitude variables are not able to explain
the increase in women’s labor force participation during the 1970s and early 1980s. Vella (1994)
uses Australian data and likewise finds that attitude variables are important determinants of the
extent of women’s involvement in market work.
There is also a small literature on cultural effects on fertility. Guinnane, Moehling, and
O Grada (2002) have a very interesting study on Irish fertility in the US in 1910. They find
that although Irish fertility fell in the US relative to couples in Ireland, Irish immigrants still
had larger families than the native-born population in the US (conditional on differences in other
observable population characteristics). This points to culture playing a role, both for first-
and second-generation Irish-Americans. Interestingly, they do not find that to be the case for
second-generation German immigrants. Our analysis, which will be based on a much larger set
of countries, will allow us to study whether such a cultural effect exists more generally.
Blau (1992) examines whether (and why) the fertility behavior of first-generation immigrant
women differs from that of the native born in the US. This is a difficult question to analyze as
she must face issues such as who selects into immigration, and the possible disrupted and delayed
fertility behavior that may result from immigration. Interestingly, she finds that the home
country variable (TFR) enters positively and significantly into explaining the fertility behavior
of immigrant women in 1970 and 1980. By examining second-generation women in the US, our
analysis will allow us to focus on questions of cultural transmission with fewer concerns about
selection and disruption due to immigration.
3. The Empirical Strategy, Data Sets, and Sample Selection
As discussed in the introduction, our empirical strategy is to isolate the effect of culture from
those of markets and institutions by studying the work and fertility outcomes of women who were
born in and reside in the US, but whose parents were born in another country. Our main data set
is the 1% 1970 Form 2 Metro Sample of the U.S. census. We use the 1970 census since this is the
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last year in which individuals were explicitly asked where their parents were born.16 The 1970
census does not provide the country of birth of an individual’s mother when both parents were
born outside U.S. Hence, we use the father’s birthplace to assign a country-of-ancestry culture
to the second-generation women in our sample.
Our main sample consists of married women who are 30-40 years old. Women in this
age range have completed their education but are still far from retirement considerations. We
exclude women living in farms or working in agricultural occupations, as well as those living in
group quarters (e.g., prisons, and other group living arrangements such as rooming houses and
military barracks).17 There are 87,305 women who are born in U.S. and satisfy these criteria.18
About 11% of them have fathers who were born outside U.S. and are thus included in our sample.
From this group we eliminate those who respond to the question about their father’s birthplace
with a continent or a geographical area from which a country cannot be identified.
To study women’s labor outcomes we mainly use either the number of weeks worked in the
previous year or the number of hours worked in the previous week. In the 1970 census, information
on weeks and hours worked is reported in intervals.19 We compute our measure of weeks and
hours worked by assigning the midpoint of each interval. The census also asks women to record
the number of children ever born to them. We use the response to this question to study fertility.
For our cultural proxies we want to use variables that would capture the beliefs as to the
appropriate role of women and, relatedly, the ideal family size, for the woman’s country of ancestry.
Female labor force participation and the total fertility rate of women are a priori good candidates
for this. Ex ante, however, it is not clear for what year we should choose to measure female LFP
and TFR for the country of ancestry. As the women in our sample are 30-40 in 1970 and were
born in U.S., their parents must have been in the US by 1930-1940, depending on the precise age
of the woman. Thus, on the one hand, it could be argued that the values of the culture proxy
16 In subsequent decades, individuals were asked to declare their “ancestry,” and thus it is impossible to distinguish
between individuals whose families have been in the US for many generations from those that are second-generation
Americans. Using earlier decades, on the other hand, runs into the problem that we cannot obtain female LFP
and TFR for more than a handful of countries prior to 1950.
17We exclude the following occupations (based on the 1950 census definition): farmers (owners and tenants),
farm managers, farm foremen, farm laborers as wage workers, farm laborers as unpaid family workers, and farm
service laborers as self-employed.
18We exclude from the sample women born in U.S. outlying areas and territories (American Samoa, Guam, Puerto
Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Other US Possessions). We also exclude from the sample women who were born in U.S.
but in an unidentified state. Their inclusion does not alter the results.
19The number of weeks worked in the previous year are recorded in six intervals: 1-13 weeks, 14-26, 27-39, 40-47,
48-49, 50-52. All other observations are coded as N/A and treated as zeros in this work. The number of hours
worked in the previous week are recorded in eight intervals: 1-14 hours, 15-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40, 41-48, 49-59, 60+.
All other observations are coded as N/A and treated as zeros in this work.
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variables around 1930-1940 or even a decade or two earlier would best reflect the culture of the
country of ancestry. On the other hand, one could argue that the values that parents and society
transmit are best reflected in what the counterparts of these women are doing in the country of
ancestry in 1970. Of course, in both cases the values of the variables reflect not only culture, but
the economics and institutions of the country over time. The point is, however, that neither the
economy nor the institutions should have particular relevance to explain the work and fertility
outcomes of the women in our sample as they were born and raised in the US. Data limitations, in
any case, do not permit us to use years prior to 1950 since values for neither variable are available
for more than a handful of countries prior to that year. Consequently, we choose female LFP
and TFR in 1950 in the country of ancestry as our benchmark cultural proxies but also explore
1960 and 1970 values as well.
The cross-country data for 1950 female LFP and TFR are from the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Demographic Yearbook, respectively. Female LFP
is the rate of economically active population for women over 10 years of age.20 The TFR is the
average number of children a hypothetical cohort of women, from the ages of 15 to 49, would have
at the end of their reproductive period if they were subject during their whole lives to the fertility
rates of a given period and if they were not subject to mortality. It is expressed as number of
children per woman.
We conclude our selection by eliminating from our sample all women whose fathers were born
in countries that became centrally planned economies around World War II.21 The rationale for
doing this is that the parents of our women must have been in the US by 1940. Hence, the
parents did not live through the profound transformations in the economies, institutions, and
cultures that these countries experienced over that period, and using data from the 1950s and later
would thus not capture the correct culture for these individuals. We also excluded Russia since
the revolution was in 1917 and the parents may or may not have been there for any substantial
length of time thereafter. For robustness, we have also run our regressions with Russia and our
results are unaffected. Lastly, solely in order to be able to make meaningful comparisons across
averages of women by country of ancestry, we also eliminated those countries with fewer than 15
20The active population includes persons in “paid” or “unpaid” employment, members of the armed forces
(including temporary members), and the unemployed (including first-time job seekers). “Unpaid” employment
includes employers, own-account workers and members of producers’ cooperatives, unpaid family workers, persons
engaged in the production of economic goods and services for own and household consumption, and apprentices
who receive pay.
21We eliminated Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania.
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observations.22 Since our regressions are all run at the individual level, including these small
numbers of observations does not affect our results. Our final sample consists of 6,774 women
and 25 countries of ancestry.
In Table I we report the summary statistics at the country level. Our countries are mainly
European (17 countries), with a few countries in the Americas (Canada, Cuba, and Mexico), some
in Asia (China, Japan, and the Philippines), and some in the Middle East (Syria and Lebanon).
Female LFP in 1950 is on average 24.4 with a standard deviation of 11.4. It varies dramatically by
country: from 7% in Lebanon to over 50% in Turkey. The TFR in 1950 also shows large variation:
from 6.9 children in Turkey and Mexico to 2.1 in Austria. The average across countries is 3.7
with a standard deviation of 1.8. Interestingly, the cross-country correlation of female LFP and
TFR in 1950 is practically zero (0.002).
The women in our sample are on average 35.7 years old, have 3.1 children, and worked on
average 15.2 weeks in the previous year and 10.2 hours in the previous week. There is large
dispersion in the number of weeks and hours worked: the standard deviation of weeks worked is
20.9 and the standard deviation of hours worked is 16.3. The standard deviation in the number
of children is 1.8. Comparing the women in our sample with their counterparts whose fathers
were born in U.S., the latter have a similar number of children on average (3.0). Women with
fathers born in the US on average worked more: 18.2 weeks a year and 13.1 hours a week. The
standard deviation is also slightly higher: 21.8 and 18.0 for weeks and hours, respectively. The
summary statistics for the women in our sample are reported in Table A1 of the Appendix.
The differences across work and fertility in 1970 for the women in our sample can also be
seen when we group observations by country of ancestry, as was done in Table I. Women with
Cuban fathers worked 27.6 weeks (15.2 hours) on average, while women with Syrian fathers
worked 9.5 weeks (5.1 hours) on average. Women with Mexican fathers on average have 4.2
kids, whereas women from Turkey have 2.2. The standard deviation in work and fertility by
country of ancestry (3.9 and 2.6 for weeks and hours worked, respectively, and 0.4 for children) is
considerably smaller than the standard deviation in these variables across all women. It is also
smaller than the standard deviation by country of ancestry in the levels of 1950 LFP and TFR.
Figure 1 plots the average number of hours worked in the previous week by the women in
our sample by country of ancestry against the logarithm of the female LFP in 1950 in the same
country. Figure 2 plots the average number of children of the women in our sample by country
22 Iceland, Luxemburg, Korea, India, Iran, and Jordan.
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of father’s birthplace against the logarithm of the TFR in 1950 in that country. The correlation
between hours worked and female LFP is 0.25 (0.06 for weeks), whereas that between children
and TFR is 0.13. From the fertility graph, one can clearly see two groups of countries: one which
has undergone the fertility revolution and another which has yet to do so.
For our analysis to be meaningful, culture should evolve relatively slowly over the time period
in which we are interested. Otherwise, in general, the beliefs transmitted from parents to children
would not be captured by past values of female LFP and TFR. Although we cannot examine the
values for our cultural proxies 20 years earlier to verify this, we can look at them 20 years later,
i.e., in 1970. The rank (Spearman) correlation across countries for female LFP in 1950 and 1970
is 0.93; the rank correlation for those same two decades in TFR is 0.85. Figures 3 and 4 show
the evolution of female LFP and TFR for each of our 25 countries (and the US as well) from
1950 to 2000. With the exception of Turkey, which shows a dramatic decrease in female LFP for
several decades, most countries show an increase in female LFP with little change in their relative
ranking. The Pearson and rank correlations for our set of 25 countries between 1950 and 2000
is 0.51 and 0.50, respectively. Over time, TFR has decreased in all countries. The Pearson and
rank correlations in TFR from 1950 to 1995 remain remarkably high: 0.86 and 0.70, respectively.
4. Results
We estimate the following model:
Zisj = β0 + β
0
1Xi + β2 eZj + fs + εisj, (4.1)
where Zisj is the work/fertility decision of woman i who resides in the Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area (SMSA) s and is of ancestry j.23 In Xi we include a set of individual characteris-
tics which varies with the specification considered, fs is a full set of dummies for the metropolitan
area of residence, and eZj is the proxy for culture—our variable of interest—which is assigned by the
country of father’s birthplace. Since the key variable on the right-hand side only varies by country
of ancestry, all the standard errors we report are corrected for clustering at the country-of-ancestry
level.
Tables II and III present our main results. In the first column, the amount worked (either
weeks worked in the previous year or hours worked in the previous week, depending on the table)
23An SMSA is an area consisting of a large population center and adjacent communities (usually counties) that
have a high degree of economic and social interaction with that center. A total of 117 SMSAs (including not residing
in an SMSA) are identified in the data.
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by individual i is regressed on the cultural proxy for work–female LFP in 1950 assigned by country
of ancestry–and on a full set of dummies for the woman’s metropolitan area of residence.24 The
coefficient on the cultural variable is positive and strongly significant, indicating that women
whose parents were born in countries where women participated less in the workforce tend to
work less themselves.
There may be many reasons for the positive partial correlation above that have little to do
with culture. In particular, women’s parents may differ in a systematic fashion by country of
origin, in a way that affects their daughters’ propensity to work. For example, if higher levels of
education increase the incentives to work, and if it is less costly for a woman to become educated
if her parents come from a high female LFP country (e.g., because these parents are themselves
more educated or because they have higher income or wealth), then this correlation would be
due to the correlation between parental characteristics by country of origin and female education.
This would suggest that, if information on parental characteristics is unavailable, we may want
to control directly for a woman’s level of education. By doing so, we are left, however, only with
the direct effect of culture on how much a woman works.
The regression results from including a series of female characteristics, in particular the
woman’s age, her age squared, and a set of dummy variables to capture her level of education
(below high school [omitted], high school degree [High School], some college, and at least a college
degree [College +]), are reported in the second column. As expected, more educated women
tend to work more. The direct effect of culture remains positive and statistically significant,
albeit somewhat smaller in magnitude, indicating that a woman’s education and female LFP in
her country of ancestry tend to be positively correlated.
It may also be instructive to include the characteristics of a woman’s husband in our regression
analysis. In part, this may allow us to distinguish between the effect of a woman’s education
and that of her husband (or of her husband’s income) on her degree of participation in the formal
labor market. How a woman’s desire to work may itself affect her choice of husband is unclear.
On the one hand, if higher levels of male education tend to be associated with a more positive
attitude towards women working, then that may lead to a positive relationship between culture
and male education. On the other hand, if a woman plans to work, she may be less concerned
with her husband’s income level and more concerned with other idiosyncratic features.25
24We examine hours in addition to weeks, as the former may be considered a better variable since it may
correspond more closely to the choices individuals make (how many hours to work rather than a number of weeks).
25See Fernández, Guner, and Knowles (2005) for an analysis of the potential trade-offs between love and money
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The third column in Tables II and III presents the results for what we call the “full specifi-
cation” in which we also include the following characteristics of a woman’s husband: his age (as
given by 10 different age range dummies), his education (as captured by the same four dummy
variables as for the woman), and his total income.26 The husband’s characteristics are important
determinants of a woman’s labor supply: a woman whose husband has at least a college degree,
everything else equal, works on average six weeks less than a woman whose husband did not
complete high school, over half the mean labor supply of the women in our sample. Marriage to
a man with $10,000 more income over the mean is associated, on average, with a woman working
four weeks less over a year. The effect of culture remains positive and statistically significant at
the 1% level, with the coefficient increasing significantly in magnitude (as do the coefficients on
female education). The latter indicates that there is a positive correlation between a woman’s
education and her husband’s education and total income as well as between these characteristics
and female LFP in her country of origin. When we do not control for the husband’s charac-
teristics, the woman’s education picks up both the positive effect of her cultural heritage and
the negative effect of her husband’s income and education, lowering the coefficient on her own
education. Similarly, when we omit the husband’s characteristics, the culture proxy also picks
up the negative effect of women from higher LFP countries tending to marry men with higher
education and income.
In the full specification an increase in the level of female LFP in 1950 of one standard
deviation (across countries) is associated with an increase of 1.06 weeks of work per year, which is
about 30% of the variation in hours worked per week across ancestries. Given that the standard
deviation of weeks worked across ancestry is equal to 3.93, this increment represents about 23%
of the variation across ancestry. Similarly, an increase of one standard deviation in the level of
female LFP in 1950 is associated with an increase of 0.82 hours per week, which is about 30% of
the variation in hours worked per week across ancestries.
Our analysis of women’s fertility behavior in Table II repeats the same regression strategy
used to analyze work, as shown in columns (v) through (vii). For all our specifications, the
culture proxy—the TFR in 1950 in the country of ancestry—is positive and statistically significant.
Unlike for our work results, however, the magnitudes on all the variables remain more or less
constant through the different exercises. Higher levels of education—both hers or her husband’s—
in household formation.
26 Income is given by the total pre-tax personal income from all sources for the previous calendar year and is
measured in tens of thousands of dollars.
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are associated with fewer children, whereas higher total income is associated with higher fertility.
Having a husband who makes $10,000 more over the mean increases the number of children by
0.12.
In the full specification, an increase of one standard deviation in 1950 TFR is associated
with an increase of 0.40 children, which represents over 95% of the standard deviation of number
of children across ancestry. It appears, therefore, that cultural differences across countries may
explain a large part of the variation one sees across ethnic groups.
Our two culture proxies may both have independent power to explain work and fertility, as
these two variables may capture different aspects of culture. For example, both variables may
reflect, in part, the belief as to the appropriate role of women in society, but 1950 TFR may
also capture some independent cultural preferences for family size (recall that the correlation of
these two variables across countries surprisingly is basically zero). Thus, in columns (iv) and
(viii) we examine the effect of including both cultural proxies in our work and fertility regressions,
respectively. The effect of including both proxy variables is asymmetric across work and fertility.
TFR in 1950 has explanatory power in the work regression (negative), but female LFP in 1950
does not help explain fertility. An increase in TFR 1950 by one standard deviation is associated
with a 0.71 decrease in weeks worked and a 0.41 decrease in hours.
Overall, our results suggest that a woman’s cultural heritage is an important factor in deter-
mining her work and fertility decisions.
5. Robustness
In this section we explore modifying our benchmark regressions in various way to investigate
whether they are robust to changes in sample criteria, alternative cultural proxies, and estimation
techniques. We also examine the extent to which our cultural proxies are capturing an important
part of the variation that would be accounted for if we had instead included country of ancestry
as an explanatory variable.
5.1. Alternative Sample Criteria and Cultural Proxies
Tables IV and V show the results of modifying our baseline regression in various ways. Column
(i) in Tables IV and V extends our sample to include all women, regardless of marital status,
for both our work and fertility analysis. We introduce instead marital status dummies (Single,
Married, Divorced/Separated, and Widowed). As shown, our cultural proxies remain positive
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and significant for both work and fertility. We also explored changing the sample of countries
to include Russia or exclude China (as arguments can be made in both cases) and to exclude
individual countries with large numbers of observations.27 Our results remained very similar.
We also examine how our results are affected by using alternative related measures of the
cultural proxies. We report results for the full specification but obtain similar results to our
benchmark ones for all specifications. Column (ii) in Table IV uses the percentage of the workforce
in 1960 which is female as the proxy for culture in the work regression (data available from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators). This variable is highly correlated with female LFP
1950 (the correlation is 0.93) and, not surprisingly, shows up positive and strongly significant in
our regression. An increase by one standard deviation (8.65) in this alternative variable is
associated with an increase of 1.1 weeks worked per year, which is of similar magnitude as that
generated by our original proxy. The next column uses the age-specific labor force participation
in 1950, for women 30-34 years old, as our cultural proxy. This allows us to control better for
demographic differences across countries.28 Again we obtain similar results as in our benchmark
model (a standard deviation increase in our cultural proxy is now associated with an increase of
1.05 weeks worked).
Column (iv) in Table IV and column (ii) in Table V report the results obtained, for work
and fertility respectively, when we use 1960 values for female LFP and TFR rather than 1950.
As discussed previously, it is not clear which decade would be the “correct” one to use, and one
may also be concerned that World War II and greater measurement error may make the earlier
decade more problematic (though these variables are highly correlated: 0.96 for work and 0.97 for
fertility). As seen, the effect of the cultural proxies remains positive and statistically significant.
A one standard deviation increase in female LFP in 1960 is associated with a 1.16 week increase
in weeks worked; a one standard deviation increase in TFR in 1960 is associated with an increase
of 0.41 children.
On the whole, our results suggest that a standard deviation increase in the work cultural
proxy leads to around a one-week increase in the number of weeks worked in 1970 (around 7%)
and to a 0.4 increase (around 14%) in the number of children. This change is equivalent to going
from having a French father instead of a Greek one or a UK father instead of a Syrian one for
27For Russia one could argue that the women’s parents may not have been there after the 1917 revolution and
hence that their culture may not be reflected in the 1950 variables. For China, whose revolution was in 1949, one
may question the significance of 1950 data.
28These numbers are from ILO and are reported in Table I.
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work, or a Cuban father rather than a German one for fertility.29
Column (iii) in Table V reports the results we obtain from the fertility regression when we
change the sample age of the women to 40-50 years old. These women are more likely to have
completed their fertility than our 30-40 years age group, and hence this analysis captures the effect
of culture on total fertility rather than on both timing and number as in our prior regression.
It is interesting to note that the effect of our cultural proxy increases markedly: a one standard
deviation increase in TFR 1950 is associated with a 0.52 increase in the number of children.
Next, we include per capita GDP in 1950 by country of ancestry in our regressions to allow for
the possibility that our results are largely driven by another important aggregate variable at the
country level.30 The cultural proxies for both work and fertility remain positive and statistically
significant for all specifications. These results are shown in columns (v) and (iv) of Tables IV
and V, respectively, for the full specification. Per capita GDP is positive and significant in some
specifications (in particular, in the full ones reported in the table). While it basically does not
affect the magnitude of the work cultural proxy, it increases that of the fertility cultural proxy
since TFR and per capita GDP are negatively correlated. Thus, it may be that per capita GDP
is proxying for unobserved wealth or education of the second-generation women, and hence its
inclusion allows us to more clearly see the effect of preferences. Alternatively, it could be that
cultural preferences are better captured by the total fertility rate adjusted for child mortality and
that the latter is proxied for by per capita GDP. Controlling for this variable thus allows for a
better measure of the true preference for family size.31
5.2. Alternative Estimation Techniques
Next we explore the use of different estimation techniques on our work outcome, as the latter
has several potential issues associated with it. Since weeks worked is reported as falling into one
of seven intervals rather than as a continuous variable, we ran an ordered probit with the seven
possible outcomes. Table VI reports the results obtained for the full specification of the model as
before.32 The first row in the table reports the predicted probability that an observation belongs
to a given interval when all variables take their mean values (e.g., the average woman in the
29We also used 1960 and 1970 female LFP for narrower age groups as well as TFR in 1970 with similar results.
30GDP per capita in 1950 Geary-Khamis dollars, Maddison (1995) data. The numbers are reported by country
in Table I.
31See Blau (1992) for a related finding.
32We used state fixed effects rather than SMSAs in this exercise since otherwise the estimation process did not
converge.
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sample has around a 57% probability of not working in the year). The second row reports the
effect on these probabilities of a marginal increment in 1950 female LFP. This effect is negative
for the first category and positive for all the others, with the largest positive effect on the interval
of 50-52 weeks. The expected value of the marginal effect on weeks worked is 0.071 weeks. This
implies that a one standard deviation increase in the cultural proxy leads to an increase of 0.81
weeks worked over the 14.76 weeks worked at the mean of our sample. This result is similar to
the one obtained previously with OLS.
Since our sample contains a large number of women who do not work but may be very
heterogeneous, we also estimate a tobit regression for weeks worked. The results for our full
specification model are reported in Table VII. Since the tobit estimation did not converge if we
simultaneously included both fixed effects and clustering at country of ancestry level, we chose
to preserve the latter option. In order to provide a meaningful comparison, therefore, the first
column reports the OLS coefficients without metropolitan area fixed effects. Columns (ii)-(iv)
report the coefficients from the tobit regression and the correspondent marginal effects for the
unconditional expected value and the probability that the observation is uncensored, calculated at
the mean of the independent variables. A one standard deviation increase in the cultural proxy
is associated with a 1.1% increase in the probability of working and a 0.78 increase in expected
weeks worked.
Lastly, we explore the effect of culture on the labor force participation decision by running a
probit regression on the probability that a woman is in the labor force (using the census definition
of labor force participation). Column (v) of Table VII reports the marginal effect evaluated at
the mean. A one standard deviation increase in the cultural proxy leads to an increase of 2.3
percentage points in the probability of working over its predicted value at the mean of 34.5%.33
5.3. Country Dummies and Cultural Proxies
We now turn to the more traditional approach of estimating (4.1) by using country dummies
rather than the quantitative home country variables as our cultural proxies. This has the benefit
of not requiring the relation between culture and outcomes to be linear in the cultural proxy.
Furthermore, it may allow different features of culture to play a role in work and fertility outcomes
other than those captured in LFP and TFR 1950. It has the previously discussed drawback,
33Since a woman’s work and fertility decisions are unlikely to be completely independent of one another, we also
estimated both models simultaneously by running a seemingly unrelated regression. The results are very much in
line with what we find running our regressions independently.
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however, of not specifying how culture matters.
Panel A of Table VIII reports the coefficients obtained on each country dummy from running
the full specification of (4.1) for weeks worked, hours worked, and number of children. For the
work regressions, the omitted country is Mexico—it has the lowest value of female LFP in 1950 in
the sample. For fertility, the omitted country is the one with the lowest TFR in 1950, Austria.
Since we are now estimating the same number of parameters as the number of countries of ancestry
in the sample, we restrict the sample to countries for which we have at least 100 observations,
leaving us with 6,191 observations and 13 countries.34
In our work and fertility regressions, the country dummies are jointly highly significant. The
magnitude of the country-of-ancestry effect ranges from four additional hours worked per year by
women with Japanese ancestry to essentially zero for women with Irish ancestry, as compared to
their Mexican counterparts. For fertility they range from 1.3 additional children for women of
Mexican ancestry to essentially no additional children for women of Swedish ancestry, as compared
to their Austrian counterparts.
The results in panel A indicate that the country of ancestry of a woman’s father matters to her
work and fertility outcomes, even after controlling for both her and her husband’s characteristics.
To what extent, however, is our choice of cultural proxy capturing an important component of the
country-of-ancestry effect? To answer this question, we run the following second-stage regression:
βj = α+ δ eZj + εj,
where βj is the coefficient on the country j dummy variable obtained in the full specification in
the first-stage regression (reported in panel A) and eZj is our cultural proxy.
Panel B reports the results of the second-stage regression: our cultural proxies are positive for
both work and fertility and are significant at the 5% level for work and at the 1% level for fertility.
An increase of one standard deviation in female LFP in 1950 is associated with an increase in a
country’s coefficient of 0.86 and 0.62 for weeks and hours worked, respectively. An increase of
one standard deviation in TFR in 1950 is associated with an increase of 0.37 in the country fixed
effect. Furthermore, the adjusted R squares are sizable, especially for fertility, indicating that
variation in female LFP and in TFR in 1950 explains an important part of the differences in the
34Using our cultural proxies with this sample yields very similar results to the original one. An increase of one
standard deviation in female LFP 1950 is associated with 0.93 more weeks worked in a year and 0.63 more hours
worked per week. An increase of one standard deviation in TFR 1950 is associated with 0.37 more children.
Restricting the sample to include only countries with a minimum of 50 observations also leads to very similar
results.
18
country coefficients.35 Hence, using these variables rather than the more “black box” approach
of a country dummy appears to be a good strategy.
6. Competing Explanations
The prior section established that our results are robust to a number of alternative variable
definitions, sample selection criteria, and estimation techniques. The main remaining concern
facing our results, therefore, is that the positive correlations that we find between our cultural
proxies and women’s work and fertility outcomes are the result of variables other than culture
and that these are simply correlated with our proxies. The two main suspects are unobserved
differences in human capital, broadly defined, and ethnic networks.
Human capital, in addition to observable formal education, may well have an unobserved
component that depends on the human capital of an individual’s parents. If parental education
varies with country of origin in a way that is correlated with the cultural proxies, this could
explain the observed correlations. Similarly, neighborhood networks, particularly ethnic ones,
may also be a component of unobserved human capital or an input into obtaining a job. We next
turn to examining these issues.
6.1. Parental Education: Results from the GSS
The census does not contain information about the education of an individual’s parents. Hence,
we turn to an alternative data set, the General Social Survey (GSS), which, in addition to providing
data on the working behavior and ethnic origins of a respondent, also has information on a
number of spousal and parental characteristics. The GSS is a series of cross sections that have
been collected annually since 1972 (except for a few years) by the National Opinion Research
Center.36 Each cross section contains about 1,500 observations, and respondents are asked about
their demographic background, political and social attitudes, and labor market outcomes.
Unfortunately, the GSS does not provide information on the country of birth of a respondent’s
parents, but it does ask, “From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come?”
We use the answer to this question to determine a woman’s ancestry, though we are no longer
able to distinguish second-generation Americans from those who have been in the US for longer.
We use observations from the years 1977, 1978, 1980, and 1982, since 1977 is the first year in
35 In addition, it should be noted that the adjusted R squares obtained by using country dummies or our cultural
proxies are very similar. In fact, in some cases, the cultural proxies yield higher adjusted R squares.
36Davis, Smith and Marsden (1999) describe the content and the sampling frame of the GSS.
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which individuals were asked about their birthplace and using one year only would provide too
few observations. In order to increase the sample size we also expand the age range to include all
married women born in the US (and whose ancestors came from elsewhere) and who are between
29 and 50 years of age. For the same reasons as in the census, we exclude individuals whose
ancestors came from those countries that became centrally planned around World War II (and
also Russia) and, to make meaningful comparisons across country averages, we exclude countries
with fewer than 10 observations. Our final sample consists of 456 women from nine countries of
ancestry: Canada, Great Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, Norway, and Sweden.37
During the sample years the GSS did not ask individuals how many weeks they worked in
the previous year. We create instead an indicator variable that is equal to one if, during the
week preceding the interview, the respondent was holding a regular job and working at least 40
hours a week; the indicator variable is set equal to zero otherwise. The summary statistics for
the sample are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. The women in our sample are on average
38 years old, have 2.5 children, and about 31% of them hold a job and work at least 40 hours a
week. The women’s fathers on average have around 10 years of schooling and their mothers have
slightly more.
We estimate the following model:
Distj = β0 + β01Xi + β2 eZj + fs + vt + εist,
where the dependent variable Distj is the indicator variable previously described that captures the
full-time work decision of a woman residing in region s, interviewed in year t, and of ancestry j.38
Xi is a vector of controls which varies with the particular specification considered, fs and vt are a
full set of dummies to capture the region of residence and the year of the interview, respectively,
and eZj is the cultural proxy for ancestry j. As before, the standard errors are corrected for
clustering at the country-of-ancestry level.
The marginal effects from the probit estimation are reported in Table IX. The specifications
are the same as previously, with additional controls for parental education measured in years. As
can be seen in the table, the coefficient on the cultural proxy for work (as before, female LFP in
1950) remains basically constant, positive, and statistically significant for all specifications, with
or without parental education. The education of a woman’s father enters negative and marginally
37We exclude from the sample eight observations that declare themselves students.
38The regional variable consists of the following nine categories: New England, Middle Atlantic, East North
Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, and Pacific.
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significant in the full specification, whereas the mother’s education is always insignificant. As
the GSS does not report the income of the spouse but only that of the respondent and the family,
for our full specification we construct the husband’s income by subtracting the woman’s income
from the family’s total income.39
Table IX allows us to conclude that culture appears to play a quantitatively important role
even after controlling for parental education.40 A one standard deviation increase in female LFP
in 1950 is associated with a 4.4 percentage point increase in the probability that a woman works
full-time. Since the predicted value of this probability, calculated at the sample mean, is 28.1%,
this increase brings the probability of working full-time to 32.5%.41
A drawback of the GSS analysis is that our sample includes only 9 countries rather than the
25 in our main sample and our sample size is significantly smaller. An alternative to controlling
for parental human capital directly is to instead use the average education of immigrants who
were in the United States in the 1940s (and whose age makes them likely to be the parents of
the women we observe in the 1970 census) as a proxy for parental education. This variable also
serves as a measure of the “quality” of the ethnic network that an individual may face. We next
turn to this analysis.
6.2. Ethnic Human Capital
As shown by George Borjas in a number of papers (1992, 1995), aggregate ethnic variables may
help explain individual outcomes such as education or earnings. In particular, Borjas has shown
that the earnings of children of immigrants are affected not only by parental earnings (as in the
usual models of intergenerational income mobility) but also by the mean earnings of the ethnic
group in the parents’ generation. In his 1995 paper, Borjas finds that the level of ethnic human
capital (as measured by average wages or average education for immigrant men in the 1940 census)
and neighborhood characteristics help explain the educational attainment and wages of second-
generation men aged 18-64 in the 1970 census. Borjas also used the NLSY, which allowed him
to control for parental education directly and found that ethnic human capital still mattered.
39Family income is total family income, from all sources in the previous year and before taxes. Respondent’s
income is labor earnings in the previous year before taxes and other deductions. Family and respondent’s incomes
on 1972-1993 surveys are in constant dollars (base = 1986). These variables are based on categorical midpoints
and imputations. For details see GSS Methodological Report No. 64.
40We were not able to repeat the same set of exercises for fertility since, once we include the husband’s charac-
teristics, the sample size is reduced and TFR 1950 is no longer significant independently of whether we control for
parental education.
41The standard deviation of female labor force participation across the nine countries in the GSS sample is 6.3,
with a mean of 26.4.
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Borjas interprets his results as showing that there are ethnic externalities in the human-capital
process.42
In this section we examine the effect of the average education of the immigrant group (ethnic
human capital) in 1940 on a woman’s work and fertility decisions. By including this variable in
our analysis, we will have a proxy both for parental human capital and, to some extent, for the
human capital embodied in the woman’s ethnic network.
To construct a measure of ethnic human capital, we use the 1940 census to calculate the
average years of education for all individuals not in group quarters who are between the ages of
25 and 44 and who were born in one of the 25 countries of our sample. We select individuals in this
age range as it corresponds roughly to the age interval in which we would find the parents of the
women in our sample. We end up with a sample of 26,247 individuals and many observations per
country.43 Across individuals, the average education is 7.9 years; across countries of ancestry, the
average is 7.8 years with a standard deviation of 1.9 years. See Table I for the average education
of immigrants, reported by country of ancestry.
The results obtained from including this variable (denoted Human Capital 1940) in our
regression analysis are given in Tables X and XI, for work and fertility, respectively. Note
that 1940 human capital is never significant in explaining fertility, neither on its own nor when
combined with our cultural proxy, TFR 1950. The effect of TFR 1950 remains positive and
statistically significant; its quantitative effect is similar to that found before. Human Capital
1940 does, however, help to explain the amount worked by women, both on its own (though
only in the full specification in column [v]) and combined with LFP 1950. Note that when we
include 1940 human capital, the coefficient on LFP 1950 remains positive and significant though
its magnitude decreases, indicating that countries with higher female LFP also tended to have
emigrants with higher human capital. This could matter, as indicated previously, either because
formal education does not capture all of women’s human capital or because the human capital
embodied in ethnic networks matters to the probability that an individual works, and thus the
1940 human capital variable captures some component of parental or neighborhood ethnic human
capital.
An alternative measure of ethnic network quality would be given by the human capital
embodied in other second-generation individuals from the same country of ancestry who belong
42Whether he thinks of these as being strictly economic or having a cultural component, however, is not clear.
43All countries have over 75 observations with the exception of Lebanon, for which we have only 4.
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to a similar age group as the women in our sample. In this case, the network would consist of
individuals within the same generation rather than across generations as previously. Tables XII
and XIII repeat the same exercise as in Tables X and XI, but this time controlling for Human
Capital 1970, i.e., the average years of education of second-generation immigrants from the same
country of ancestry who are between the ages of 25 and 45.44 We find a very similar pattern of
results as for 1940 Human Capital, with the exception that human capital in 1970 is not significant
when female LFP 1950 is included in the full specification for the work regression.45
We also explored the robustness of our results to other measures of ethnic human capital for
both 1940 and 1970. In particular, we used average education only of women, only of men, and
for 1940, also only of married women and only of married men. Our results were very similar
across all cases.
6.3. Men and Culture
In this section we conduct what we consider a critical test of the validity of our hypothesis. In
particular, we ask whether our proxy for cultural attitudes towards women working (female LFP
1950) is able to positively and significantly explain how much second-generation men work in
the United States in 1970. If the explanatory power of our proxy is truly coming from culture
rather than from some omitted correlated variable, then the cultural proxy should not have
similar explanatory power for how much men work. That is, unless something like a household
substitution effect is in operation, there is no a priori reason to expect that beliefs as to the
proper role of women in society should explain how much men work.46 As we show below, our
hypothesis passes this test with flying colors. The same asymmetry, however, should not extend
necessarily to our cultural proxy for children. The number of children in the household is common
to both spouses, and thus there may be a cultural attitude towards family size that is common for
men and women. Consequently, one may well expect the cultural proxy (TFR 1950) to capture
cultural preferences towards family size and hence help explain the number of children of men
and women. This is indeed the case, as we show below.
We select the men for our sample with the same procedure used to construct our sample of
44See Table I for the value of this variable by country. The mean is 12.3 years with a standard deviation of 0.86.
45Note that the dependent variable in the work regression is now hours worked. We could not use weeks worked
as human capital 1970 and LFP 1950 are highly correlated (over 0.7) and they both became insignificant (and the
adjusted R squared decreased) when they were both included in the same specification for weeks worked.
46The cultural proxy could, however, have a negative and significant coefficient if individuals tend to marry others
within their own ancestry and if men whose wives work less tend to work more themselves to increase household
income. This, however, as we show, is not the case.
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women. That is, we select all married men, age 30-40, born in the US, and not living on farms
or group quarters and not working in agriculture. From this group we exclude all men whose
fathers were born in the US (leaving us with approximately 11% of the sample), eliminate those
whose replies were not countries, and exclude the European centrally planned economies. Lastly,
we drop those countries with fewer than 15 observations. Our final sample of men has 6,710
observations and the same 25 countries as for our main sample of women.
In 1970, the men in our sample were working on average 41.3 hours a week (with a standard
deviation of 14.9 hours) and 49.0 weeks a year (with a standard deviation of 7 weeks). As in
the case of women, the individual means are basically the same as those obtained by averaging
observations by country of ancestry, whereas the standard deviations are significantly smaller for
the latter (3.1 and 0.9 for hours and weeks, respectively). Interestingly, the men in our sample
(unlike their female counterparts) work slightly more than men whose fathers were born in the
US (the latter worked on average 40.5 hours per week and 48.7 weeks per year with standard
deviations of 16.1 hours and 7.7 weeks, respectively).
In order to easily test whether the coefficients on the cultural proxies are significantly different
for men and women, we combine the sample of 6,710 men with the sample of 6,774 women for a
total of 13,484 individuals and 25 countries. Our regressions now include a dummy variable for
each gender, which we in addition interact with all explanatory variables in all specifications.
We report our results both for weeks and for hours worked in Table XIV. We are particu-
larly interested in hours as, especially for men, weeks worked may not capture the intensity of
an individual’s work efforts. The main variables of interest are Female x LFP 1950 and Male x
LFP 1950. Note that when the observation is a woman we use her father’s country of birth to
assign ancestry and if the observation is a man we use his father’s country of birth. As shown in
the table, the culture proxy is never significant in explaining how much men work once individual
characteristics are included in the work regression. As before, however, the culture proxy is posi-
tively and significantly associated with how much women work in all specifications. Furthermore,
we can reject at the 1% and 5% levels for weeks and hours, respectively, the hypothesis that the
coefficients on the culture proxy for men and women are equal. It is interesting to note that
a wife’s education (coefficients not shown) has the opposite effect on the work behavior of her
spouse (positive) than a husband’s education has on the work behavior of his spouse (negative).
The effect of spouse’s income is negative across genders.
While our ability to reject the hypothesis that the culture proxy variable helps explain how
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much men work is not definitive evidence in favor of our thesis, it does significantly decrease the
probability that other omitted variables are driving our results. It also points to the fact that,
if there is some omitted variable that is positively correlated to female LFP 1950, it would most
likely have explanatory power for women’s labor supply but not for men’s. It is not easy to
imagine what such a variable might be, such that it did not also contain a significant component
of culture. For example, this variable may be picking up the possibility that parents from low
female LFP countries invest less in unobserved human capital for their daughters relative to their
sons than parents from high female LFP countries, precisely the type of cultural explanation we
are attempting to explore. That is, although one may conjecture that this asymmetric behavior
may have existed for purely economic reasons in the country of ancestry, the fact that this pattern
is repeated in a different economic and institutional context makes it likely that this behavior also
reflects important beliefs about the role of women.
Lastly, we examine whether the cultural proxy for family size, TFR in 1950, has explanatory
power for men as well as for women. We now use the number of children in the household as the
dependent variable, as this allows us to treat both men and women symmetrically. The results
of this analysis are presented in Table XV.
As shown in the table, the cultural proxy for children is positive and significant for both
women and men. The coefficient is larger for women than for men (the hypothesis that they are
equal can be rejected at the 1% level), which may indicate that women may respond more to the
cultural background of their parents (or perhaps of their neighborhood) than men.47 Interestingly,
unlike for the case of work, the number of children in the household is associated negatively with
the level of the spouse’s education for both genders. The effect of a spouse’s income, however,
is now asymmetric, though this is not surprising given traditional gender roles. A man whose
wife’s total income is high tends to have fewer children; a woman whose husband’s total income
is high tends to have more children.
7. Her or His Culture?
A married woman’s work and fertility outcomes are likely to be influenced not only by the factors
that we have already explored—her age and education, her beliefs as embodied in the cultural
proxies, and her husband’s characteristics–but also by the beliefs—by the culture—of her husband.
In this section we wish to explore whether the husband’s cultural beliefs as to the role of women
47Whether women and men “assimilate” at a different rate is an interesting question to pursue in future research.
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and family size affect his wife’s work and fertility outcomes. Of course, a woman’s culture and
that of her husband’s are unlikely to be random: a woman who would like to work or would prefer
a larger family is presumably more likely to marry a man who would be in agreement with these
choices. Nonetheless, it is of interest to ask whether it is her culture or her husband’s culture or
both that matter to these outcomes.48
In order to study whose culture matters to a woman’s work and fertility outcomes, we include
cultural proxies for both the woman and her husband, in each case assigned by the country of
birth of each spouse’s father. Note that many women will be married to men whose fathers were
born in the US. To these men, therefore, we must associate US female LFP and TFR in 1950.
In order to not have an asymmetric sample in which the US variables would only appear as a
cultural proxy when associated with a woman’s husband, we expand our sample to include women
whose fathers were born in the US but whose fathers-in-law are foreign-born. We follow the same
procedure we described earlier: we drop those women whose father-in-law is from a European
centrally planned economy or from a country for which we have fewer than 15 observations. Our
final sample consists of 12,060 married women and 26 countries (including US).49 In this sample,
32.6% of women are married to men whose father was born in the US (and thus these women’s
fathers were born elsewhere); 47.6% of the women have fathers born in the US (and hence they are
married to men with foreign born fathers). The remaining 19.7% of women and their husbands
both have fathers born outside the US. Only 13.7% of the couples in our sample share the same
culture (i.e., have fathers born in the same country), though this is due to the fact that we have
omitted those women with US fathers and US fathers-in-law. If we were to restrict our attention
to couples in which neither spouse has a father born in the US, then 69.4% of these share the
same culture.
To study the effect of the two spouses’ cultures, we distinguish between couples who share
identical cultures (i.e., their fathers were born in the same country) from those with different
cultures. We create two dummy variables: Same (for same culture) and Not Same (for different
cultures) and interact these with the cultural proxies. It should be noted that the number of
observations for same culture is relatively small (1653). The results of our regression analysis are
reported for the full specification in Table XVI.
48Once one leaves the unitary household model, there is no reason to believe that husbands and wives necessarily
share the same preferences over outcomes (see, e.g., Lundberg and Pollak [1996]).
49Another way of thinking about our sample selection is that from the universe of married women born in the US
and between the ages of 30-40, we have eliminated those women who have both a US born father and a US born
father-in-law.
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The first column in Table XVI reports the results for weeks worked using only the wife’s
cultural proxy for work. As before, it is positive and statistically significant (for Not Same).
The next column uses only the husband’s cultural proxy, which is also positive and statistically
significant. The third column uses both proxies. Interestingly, the coefficient on the husband’s
cultural proxy is larger and more significant than that of his wife’s (which is no longer significant).
Furthermore, in this last specification, the coefficient on the cultural proxy when the culture of
the two spouses is the same is significant (at the 10% level) and larger than either of the two
different cultures coefficients.
Columns (iv)-(vi) in Table XVI repeat the same specifications for fertility. The cultural proxy
is positive and significant when it is the wife’s, the husband’s, and when both are simultaneously
included. When the wife and husband share the same culture, the cultural proxy is also positive
and significant, this time in all three specifications. The coefficients for each spouse separately
are basically equal, as are the coefficients for each spouse when they are entered jointly in the
final specification. In this last specification, the sum of the coefficients on the wife’s and the
husband’s cultural proxies is essentially the same as the coefficient on cultural proxy when the
spouses share the same culture.
We have also experimented with restricting our sample to the subset of women who have
neither a US father nor a US father-in-law.50 The results are similar to the ones above except
that for the work regressions the cultural proxy when the couple shares the same culture is now
much larger, positive, and significant for all three specifications.
8. Cultural Transmission
In this section we briefly explore the role of neighborhood composition in cultural transmission.
An individual’s neighborhood may play an important role in transmitting and preserving a set
of beliefs, independently of the human capital embodied in an individual’s ethnic network. A
neighborhood that has a relatively high proportion of individuals from the same ancestry may
help preserve that country’s culture by punishing behavior that is different from the norm (by,
for example, ostracizing the deviant individual). It may also keep the culture of the country of
ancestry alive by providing role models and diffusing specific beliefs about how individuals, and
in particular women, should act. In this section we partially explore the role of neighborhoods
in cultural transmission and preservation by investigating how the propensity of an ethnic group
50There are 2,381 such observations.
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to cluster in the same neighborhood affects the impact of culture. The hypothesis is that the
greater the proportion of an ethnic group in a neighborhood, the larger the effect of the cultural
proxies on individual behavior. Note that this is a different type of “ethnic externality” from
those explored by Borjas in his work. Here it is not the education of the ethnic group that is
an input into the production of an individual’s human capital, but rather the greater presence of
this group in a community that facilitates the transmission and preservation of a particular set
of beliefs.
To explore the role of ethnic density, we turn to data provided in Borjas (1995). Borjas uses
the 1/100 Neighborhood File of the 1970 US census to study the effect of ethnicity and neigh-
borhoods on intergenerational transmission. He calculates the extent of residential segregation
for both first- and second-generation Americans by estimating the proportion of the respondent’s
neighborhood that is of the same ethnicity and then averaging this number across respondents.51
We use Borjas’ estimates of residential segregation for second-generation Americans to attach an
average ethnic density to each country of ancestry.52 These numbers are reported by country of
ancestry in Table I.
As can be seen in Table I, on average, second-generation Americans typically live in neigh-
borhoods where the density of their own ethnic group is 4.3% with a standard deviation of 4.5%
(i.e., the average second-generation American resides in a neighborhood in which 4.3% of the
community is from the same ethnic group). Mexicans, Italians, and Japanese live in ethnically
dense neighborhoods (respectively, 18.1, 12.1, and 12.6), whereas Turks, French, and Lebanese
live in neighborhoods with low ethnic density (0.3, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively). Note that the
ethnic density number depends both on the extent to which members of an ethnic group cluster
into the same neighborhoods and on how large that ethnic group is in the population (since if the
ethnic group is not large, then even if they tended to cluster, this could show up as a low density
number). The rank correlation of the number of observations by country of ancestry in Table I
and ethnic density is 0.5, showing that both elements probably play a role. In any case, from
the perspective of cultural transmission, it may not matter which variable is the source of ethnic
density.
In order to explore the effect of ethnic density, we include density, the cultural proxy, and
51See Borjas (1995), Table 2.
52Borjas does not include Spain, so individuals from this country of ancestry are excluded in the analysis that
follows. He also has separate entries for England, Wales, and Scotland, which we aggregate to one U.K. value by
weighing each separate density figure by the proportion of U.K. observations in our sample that come from each of
these three countries.
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density interacted with the culture proxy in our regression analysis both separately and jointly.
Tables XVII and XVIII report the effects for hours worked and fertility, respectively.53 Across all
specifications, density is significant only if the culture proxy variable is also included. The last
column in each table reports the coefficients for the full specification. Note that the interaction of
culture and density is positive and significant. Moreover, the full marginal effects of female LFP
1950 and TFR 1950 remain positive and significant, whereas the full marginal effect of density
is insignificant when evaluated at the mean. A one standard deviation increase in female LFP
1950 is associated with a 0.76 increase in hours worked (evaluated at the mean of density); a
one standard deviation increase in TFR 1950 is associated with a 0.19 increase in the number of
children.
From the above we conclude that the degree to which ethnic groups cluster in the same
neighborhoods appears to be an important mechanism in maintaining culture: the greater the
average density of an ethnic group, the greater the impact of culture on a woman’s work and
fertility outcomes.54
9. Conclusion
This paper argues that culture matters to important economic outcomes, namely, female work and
fertility. We show that female LFP and TFR in 1950 by country of ancestry, our cultural proxies,
are economically and statistically significant in explaining how much women work and how many
children they have. We also examine the most likely suspects that could be responsible for our
results. In particular, we have shown that neither unobserved human capital nor network quality
is likely to be a driving force. On the other hand, we find that the average propensity of an ethnic
group to cluster in the same neighborhood magnifies the impact of the cultural proxies on work
and fertility, which is consistent with our theory that cultural transmission through the family
and neighborhood matters. Perhaps most convincingly of all, we have shown that the cultural
proxy for female work has no explanatory power for the work behavior of a similar sample of
men (in line with our hypothesis that this variable reflects cultural attitudes towards women in
society), whereas the cultural proxy for fertility is significant in explaining the number of children
they have.
There are, of course, other interpretations of the empirical evidence other than ours of culture.
53Similar results are obtained for weeks worked.
54Whether this has positive or negative welfare effects depends on one’s view about the validity of the underlying
beliefs.
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For example, if household skills are transmitted primarily from mothers to daughters and if these
are higher for mothers who do not work, then the traditional comparative advantage argument
may help explain why the daughters of women from low female LFP countries tend to work less.
This alternative hypothesis, however, would not explain why the impact of the cultural proxy is
stronger the greater the propensity of the ethnic group to cluster into neighborhoods.
Another hypothesis is that there are varying degrees of discrimination in the US labor market
that (negatively) correlate with female LFP in the country of ancestry. We do not think that
such a correlation is very plausible, especially since most of our sample consists of women from
European countries of ancestry. Furthermore, we do not see this pattern for men by country of
ancestry. This implies that if discrimination (in hiring) is responsible for the observed pattern of
results, it would have to be faced only by the women and not by the men from these countries,
which seems rather implausible.
We think that our estimates of the quantitative impact of culture are likely to underestimate
its true importance. Indeed, we find it telling that despite the fact that we study the work and
fertility behavior of second-generation immigrants to the US (who are likely never to have set
foot in their father’s country of ancestry), and despite the fact that we control for most of the
indirect effects of culture (a woman’s education and her husband’s age, education, and income),
we nonetheless find the direct effect of our cultural proxies to be significant. We think, therefore,
that culture is likely to play an important role in explaining the large variation across time and
countries in women’s work and fertility. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that culture’s
impact is restricted to the variables we studied. Culture is also likely to play a role in explaining
cross-country variation in other individual economic outcomes such as entrepreneurial activity,
creativity, and physical and human capital accumulation. These, similarly to female labor force
participation and fertility, are all likely to affect aggregate outcomes such as per capita GDP,
growth, or inequality. Culture, therefore, is too important an area for economists to ignore.
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Table I
Country Obs. Weeks Hours Children Female LFP TFR GDP pc Human Cap. Human Cap. Avg. Ethnic Female 30-34
Worked Worked 1950 1950 1950 1940 1970 Density LFP 1950
Canada 720 14.88 10.41 3.29 17.82 3.73 7291 9.60 12.10 7.40 20.95
Mexico 839 15.23 10.87 4.22 8.42 6.87 2365 4.59 9.17 18.10 11.90
Cuba 17 27.62 15.24 2.41 12.19 4.10 2046 8.13 12.50 4.70 21.33
Denmark 80 15.02 12.20 3.00 32.32 2.54 6943 9.45 12.63 0.90 38.30
Finland 54 15.36 11.07 2.56 39.56 2.97 4253 7.43 12.44 3.90 58.45
Norway 141 16.14 10.49 2.82 20.11 2.60 5463 9.00 12.44 3.00 20.11
Sweden 187 15.66 9.93 2.74 23.21 2.21 6739 8.89 12.77 1.70 27.05
U.K. 498 15.77 9.43 2.86 25.34 2.18 6939 9.77 12.86 1.20 26.85
Ireland 465 11.38 7.42 3.51 22.95 3.38 3453 8.33 12.70 3.30 27.90
Belgium 24 13.00 6.58 3.29 18.98 2.33 5462 8.52 12.08 0.70 23.90
France 66 13.83 9.74 3.14 28.28 2.73 5271 9.29 12.31 0.30 27.05
Netherlands 101 15.84 9.55 3.16 18.65 3.06 5996 8.85 12.29 3.90 18.55
Switzerland 50 22.10 12.78 3.24 25.73 2.28 9064 9.60 12.62 0.80 27.70
Greece 197 13.57 9.47 2.48 17.95 2.29 1915 7.07 12.83 1.10 25.00
Italy 1909 14.88 9.77 2.76 20.99 2.32 3502 5.91 11.76 12.10 25.05
Portugal 100 16.15 11.83 3.13 16.99 3.04 2086 5.15 10.74 6.80 22.20
Spain 65 15.23 8.71 2.58 12.56 2.57 2189 6.84 12.22 . 17.21
Austria 270 14.53 9.96 2.77 36.29 2.09 3706 7.64 12.58 2.10 44.60
Germany 616 16.27 10.82 2.87 34.23 2.16 3881 8.95 12.48 3.20 44.53
China 53 18.75 13.27 2.64 47.12 6.22 439 7.30 13.52 6.20 80.90
Japan 148 22.64 16.84 2.43 32.99 2.75 1921 9.36 13.03 12.60 49.15
Philippines 67 22.63 14.53 3.07 23.75 7.29 1070 9.08 11.72 6.50 46.39
Lebanon 27 12.94 10.50 3.04 6.90 5.74 2429 1.50 12.73 0.40 10.50
Syria 38 9.53 5.09 2.82 14.85 7.20 2409 6.97 12.35 0.80 23.59
Turkey 42 14.00 10.63 2.21 52.76 6.90 1623 7.58 13.44 0.30 77.95
Average 270.96 16.12 10.68 2.92 24.44 3.66 3938.20 7.79 12.33 4.25 32.68
Std. Dev 414.12 3.93 2.57 0.42 11.40 1.83 2289.36 1.92 0.86 4.54 18.41
Sources: 1% 1970 Form 2 Metro Sample of the U.S. Census, 1% 1940 General Sample of the U.S. Census, ILO, Economically Active Population, 1950-2010, (Geneva, 1997),
United Nation Demographic Yearbook 1997, Historical supplement, Table 4 and Borjas (1995), Table 2. For variable definitions, see text.
COUNTRY SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table II
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Female 0.066** 0.049* 0.093** 0.061** -0.010
LFP 1950 (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.008)
TFR 1950 -0.386* 0.250** 0.219** 0.219** 0.194**
(0.167) (0.056) (0.041) (0.041) (0.051)
High School 1.598* 3.783** 3.651** -0.415* -0.393** -0.378*
(0.676) (0.677) (0.643) (0.181) (0.151) (0.147)
Some College -0.171 4.189** 4.111** -0.503* -0.485** -0.457*
(1.183) (1.172) (1.133) (0.213) (0.185) (0.179)
College + 2.132** 8.909** 8.801** -0.869** -0.865** -0.838**
(0.824) (0.881) (0.836) (0.214) (0.204) (0.195)
Husband -2.530** -2.620** -0.218+ -0.210+
High School (0.901) (0.880) (0.116) (0.113)
Husband -1.647+ -1.716+ -0.184+ -0.177+
Some College (0.894) (0.893) (0.103) (0.103)
Husband -6.281** -6.369** -0.194** -0.185**
College + (0.750) (0.768) (0.050) (0.049)
Husband -4.067** -4.097** 0.116* 0.118*
Total Income (0.368) (0.358) (0.049) (0.049)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.013 0.020 0.052 0.053 0.059 0.098 0.105 0.106
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, WORK AND FERTILITY
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked Dependent variable is Children
Table III
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Female 0.047** 0.041* 0.072** 0.053**
LFP 1950 (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
TFR 1950 -0.225*
(0.103)
High School 0.490 2.136** 2.059**
(0.520) (0.575) (0.572)
Some College -0.147 3.205** 3.160**
(1.078) (1.034) (1.024)
College + 0.815+ 6.032** 5.968**
(0.492) (0.494) (0.480)
Husband -1.737* -1.789*
High School (0.730) (0.716)
Husband -1.329 -1.370+
Some College (0.829) (0.822)
Husband -5.003** -5.054**
College + (0.452) (0.459)
Husband -2.844** -2.862**
Total Income (0.308) (0.303)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.018 0.024 0.053 0.053
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Income is measured in units of $10,000
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at country level. All specifications include a constant.
Dependent variable is Hours Worked
CULTURE AND HOURS WORKED
Table IV
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Female 0.057** 0.090**
LFP 1950 (0.013) (0.024)
Female 30-34 0.057**
LFP 1950 (0.020)
Female 0.114**
LFP 1960 (0.027)
% LF 1960 0.128**
Female (0.031)
GDP pc 1950 0.267**
(0.097)
High School 3.125** 3.734** 3.846** 3.736** 3.737**
(0.596) (0.676) (0.696) (0.679) (0.654)
Some College 2.227* 4.116** 4.260** 4.111** 4.114**
(1.090) (1.170) (1.208) (1.173) (1.153)
College + 3.55** 8.843** 8.982** 8.828** 8.839**
(0.522) (0.860) (0.916) (0.861) (0.846)
Husband -2.572** -2.478** -2.570** -2.592**
High School (0.891) (0.916) (0.889) (0.871)
Husband -1.681+ -1.609+ -1.678+ -1.705+
Some College (0.890) (0.896) (0.888) (0.882)
Husband -6.335** -6.224** -6.332** -6.356**
College + (0.753) (0.743) (0.750) (0.752)
Husband -4.077** -4.046** -4.075** -4.092**
Total Income (0.366) (0.371) (0.367) (0.362)
Obs. 8280 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.142 0.053 0.052 0.053 0.053
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Marital status dummies included in the
first specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at country level. GDP pc is measured in units
of $1,000. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
ROBUSTNESS - WORK
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked
Table V
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
TFR 1960 0.245**
(0.038)
TFR 1950 0.203** 0.286** 0.236**
(0.037) (0.071) (0.038)
GDP pc 1950 0.048**
(0.016)
High School -0.404* -0.380* -0.175+ -0.393**
(0.157) (0.147) (0.106) (0.151)
Some College -0.477* -0.465** -0.195 -0.491**
(0.190) (0.177) (0.134) (0.184)
College + -0.817** -0.836** -0.220 -0.869**
(0.176) (0.195) (0.177) (0.202)
Husband -0.211+ -0.109* -0.224+
High School (0.113) (0.050) (0.116)
Husband -0.180+ -0.071 -0.190+
Some College (0.101) (0.094) (0.105)
Husband -0.192** -0.018 -0.202**
College + (0.048) (0.076) (0.049)
Husband 0.114* 0.069+ 0.114*
Total Income (0.048) (0.040) (0.049)
Obs. 8280 6774 10744 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.235 0.109 0.083 0.107
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Marital status dummies included in the
first specification. Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at country level. GDP pc is meaured in units
of $1,000. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
ROBUSTNESS - FERTILITY
Dependent variable is Children
Table VI
Category 0 1 - 13 14 - 26 27 - 39 40 - 47 48 - 49 50 - 52
Predicted 0.5762 0.0825 0.0562 0.0569 0.0458 0.0238 0.1585
Probability
Marginal Effect -0.0016 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0010
Female LFP 1950
Obs. 6774
Pseudo R-sq 0.023
Female LFP 1950 significant at 1%. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean, and refer to full specification
model, state fixed effects included. Marginal effects for other controls not reported. Robust standard errors
account for clustering at country level.
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked
ORDERED PROBIT
Weeks Worked Labor Force
OLS Probit
Coeff. Unconditional Pr(y>0)
Exp. Value
(i)                (ii)      (iii)  (iv)         (v)          
Female 0.081* 0.152* 0.068 0.001 0.002**
LFP 1950 (0.033) (0.070) (0.001)
High School 3.645** 7.183** 3.227 0.070 0.064**
(0.630) (1.453) (0.014)
Some College 4.487** 9.620** 4.702 0.095 0.108**
(1.140) (2.597) (0.029)
College + 9.207** 22.199** 12.034 0.215 0.240**
(0.840) (2.096) (0.020)
Husband -2.371* -5.067** -2.251 -0.049 -0.057**
High School (0.916) (1.861) (0.019)
Husband -1.603* -3.451* -1.516 -0.034 -0.042*
Some College (0.866) (1.763) (0.019)
Husband -6.166** -13.173** -5.446 -0.126 -0.142**
College + (0.627) (1.763) (0.012)
Husband -4.324** -11.931** -5.390 -0.117 -0.113**
Total Income (0.383) (1.284) (0.014)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6726
Adj. R-sq 0.042
Psd. R-sq 0.0543
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Marginal effects in third and fourth column 
are calculated at the mean of the independent variables. Age and age squared for wife and age range
dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. The last two specifications include SMSA
fixed effects. Robust standard errors account for clustering at country level.
Table VII
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES
Weeks Worked
Tobit
Table VIII
Panel A
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Canada 2.023** 0.480 2.236** 0.414 0.499** 0.033
Mexico 1.301** 0.089
Norway 3.078** 0.649 1.819** 0.550 0.052 0.045
Sweden 3.639** 0.576 2.290** 0.590 -0.041 0.051
U.K. 3.261** 0.566 1.620** 0.468 0.173** 0.033
Ireland -0.289 0.645 0.281 0.511 0.878** 0.040
Netherlands 3.354** 0.516 1.880** 0.438 0.198** 0.054
Greece 0.710 0.648 1.251* 0.484 -0.241** 0.034
Italy 2.072* 0.698 1.762** 0.483 -0.002 0.020
Portugal 2.388** 0.674 2.688** 0.513 0.044 0.087
Austria 2.297* 0.876 2.147** 0.599
Germany 3.661** 0.529 2.734** 0.398 0.161** 0.026
Japan 4.932** 0.668 4.000** 0.795 -0.113 0.123
Obs. 6191 6191 6191
Adj. R-sq 0.052 0.050 0.123
Panel B
Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error
Female LFP 0.109* 0.048 0.079* 0.032
1950
TFR 1950 0.292** 0.050
Obs. 13 13 13
Adj. R-sq 0.254 0.299 0.731
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. All regressions in Panel A include full set
of individual characteristics for the woman and her husband and SMSA fixed effects (coefficients not reported).
Robust standard errors account for clustering at country level.
Weeks Hours Children
COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS AND CULTURAL PROXIES
First Stage Regression
Second Stage Regression
Weeks Hours Children
Table IX
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Female 0.007** 0.006** 0.007* 0.007** 0.007**
LFP 1950 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
High School 0.158** 0.182** 0.153** 0.140**
(0.045) (0.068) (0.041) (0.054)
Some College 0.131+ 0.135* 0.135 0.092
(0.076) (0.056) (0.098) (0.062)
College + 0.271** 0.292** 0.368** 0.328**
(0.098) (0.076) (0.105) (0.078)
Husband 0.069 0.144**
High School (0.051) (0.055)
Husband 0.121+ 0.247**
Some College (0.069) (0.056)
Husband -0.033 0.045
College + (0.060) (0.086)
Husband -0.037** -0.029**
Total Income (0.008) (0.008)
Mother's 0.001 0.010
Education (0.007) (0.007)
Father's -0.012 -0.016+
Education (0.009) (0.009)
Obs. 456 455 348 415 322
Pseudo R-sq 0.037 0.057 0.007 0.102 0.117
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Region and year of survey fixed effects in all
specifications. Age and age squared variables are included in all specifications with demographics.
Full-time work is defined as working at least 40 hours. Robust standard errors in parentheses account for
clustering at country level. Income measured in units of $10,000.
CULTURE, WORK, AND PARENTAL EDUCATION -- GSS
Probit for whether woman works full time -- Marginal Effects
Table X
(i)          (ii)          (iii)          (iv)          (v)          (vi)          
Human Capital 0.205 0.074 0.175 0.091 0.399** 0.261+
1940 (0.160) (0.151) (0.122) (0.138) (0.145) (0.138)
Female 0.057* 0.039 0.065*
LFP 1950 (0.028) (0.030) (0.029)
High School 1.647* 1.567* 3.836** 3.719**
(0.646) (0.651) (0.664) (0.653)
Some College -0.130 -0.232 4.204** 4.057**
(1.182) (1.179) (1.164) (1.152)
College + 2.195* 2.076* 8.974** 8.807**
(0.876) (0.849) (0.905) (0.869)
Husband -2.522** -2.583**
High School (0.867) (0.866)
Husband -1.678+ -1.714*
Some College (0.858) (0.867)
Husband -6.303** -6.360**
College + (0.746) (0.745)
Husband -4.071** -4.086**
Total Income (0.365) (0.364)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.012 0.013 0.020 0.020 0.052 0.052
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, WORK, AND 1940 HUMAN CAPITAL
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked
Table XI
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Human Capital -0.080 -0.004 -0.035 0.031 -0.030 0.033
1940 (0.091) (0.028) (0.067) (0.021) (0.062) (0.021)
TFR 1950 0.248** 0.232** 0.232**
(0.056) (0.047) (0.047)
High School -0.552* -0.428* -0.505** -0.404**
(0.221) (0.177) (0.182) (0.149)
Some College -0.630** -0.530** -0.578** -0.509**
(0.240) (0.202) (0.201) (0.177)
College + -1.031** -0.895** -0.980** -0.884**
(0.258) (0.208) (0.236) (0.202)
Husband -0.289* -0.226*
High School (0.130) (0.115)
Husband -0.237* -0.194+
Some College (0.099) (0.104)
Husband -0.264** -0.206**
College + (0.049) (0.049)
Husband 0.094+ 0.114*
Total Income (0.055) (0.048)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.027 0.059 0.072 0.099 0.079 0.106
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, CHILDREN, AND 1940 HUMAN CAPITAL
Dependent variable is Children
Table XII
(i)            (ii)            (iii)            (iv)            (v)            (vi)            
Human Capital 0.153 -0.224 0.075 -0.292 0.486** 0.155
1970 (0.155) (0.234) (0.134) (0.203) (0.136) (0.209)
Female 0.067** 0.065* 0.059*
LFP 1950 (0.023) (0.025) (0.026)
High School 0.590* 0.592 2.096** 2.093**
(0.491) (0.493) (0.546) (0.547)
Some College 0.000 -0.012 3.169** 3.151**
(1.060) (1.060) (1.002) (1.004)
College + 0.973+ 0.969+ 5.985** 5.973**
(0.537) (0.528) (0.498) (0.482)
Husband -1.769* -1.765*
High School (0.727) (0.728)
Husband -1.374 -1.358
Some College (0.819) (0.826)
Husband -5.044** -5.036**
College + (0.471) (0.465)
Husband -2.855** -2.852**
Total Income (0.306) (0.307)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.017 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.052 0.053
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, WORK, AND 1970 HUMAN CAPITAL
Dependent variable is Hours Worked
Table XIII
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Human Capital -0.343** -0.184+ -0.268** -0.096 -0.265** -0.091
1970 (0.073) (0.028) (0.056) (0.099) (0.053) (0.097)
TFR 1950 0.163* 0.176* 0.179*
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074)
High School -0.401* -0.383* -0.383* -0.368*
(0.165) (0.168) (0.139) (0.141)
Some College -0.430* -0.448* -0.420* -0.443*
(0.193) (0.193) (0.171) (0.171)
College + -0.803** -0.811** -0.810** -0.823**
(0.197) (0.196) (0.195) (0.194)
Husband -0.214+ -0.203+
High School (0.109) (0.111)
Husband -0.169+ -0.168
Some College (0.094) (0.098)
Husband -0.181** -0.176**
College + (0.046) (0.048)
Husband 0.115* 0.120*
Total Income (0.048) (0.048)
Obs. 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774 6774
Adj. R-sq 0.056 0.065 0.089 0.099 0.096 0.106
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, CHILDREN, AND 1970 HUMAN CAPITAL
Dependent variable is Children
Table XIV
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked Dependent variable is Hours Worked
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Female x Female 0.066* 0.049+ 0.093** 0.047** 0.041* 0.072**
LFP 1950 (0.024) (0.024) (0.028) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015)
Male x Female 0.030+ 0.008 0.006 0.028 -0.003 -0.005
LFP 1950 (0.015) (0.009) (0.008) (0.046) (0.037) (0.035)
Female 14.628** 47.668 0.090 9.940** 31.455 -1.818
(0.895) (33.025) (31.031) (0.470) (30.093) (28.515)
Male 47.956** 53.981** 45.967** 40.662** 29.108 23.851
(0.508) (7.913) (10.567) (1.258) (29.668) (27.897)
Female x High School 1.598* 3.783** 0.491 2.137**
(0.676) (0.677) (0.520) (0.576)
Female x Some College -0.173 4.187** -0.147 3.205**
(1.184) (1.173) (1.079) (1.037)
Female x College 2.134* 8.912** 0.816 6.032**
(0.824) (0.882) (0.493) (0.495)
Male x High School 1.739** 1.388** 2.323** 1.977**
(0.305) (0.286) (0.618) (0.614)
Male x Some College 1.714** 1.272** 2.892** 2.346**
(0.306) (0.277) (0.601) (0.667)
Male x College 2.071** 1.595** 2.647** 1.831**
(0.302) (0.311) (0.550) (0.597)
Husband's Education YES YES
Wife's Education YES YES
Husband's Total Income -4.068** -2.845**
(0.368) (0.307)
Wife's Total Income -2.142** -2.166**
(0.370) (0.626)
Obs. 13484 13484 13484 13484 13484 13484
Adj. R-sq 0.845 0.846 0.851 0.790 0.791 0.795
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
and age range dummies for spouse interacted with sex dummies in all specifications with demographics.
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000.
MEN, WORK, AND CULTURE
Table XV
Dependent variable is Own Children Living in Household
(i) (ii) (iii)
Female x TFR 1950 0.198** 0.185** 0.191**
(0.041) (0.033) (0.034)
Male x TFR 1950 0.136** 0.132** 0.123**
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026)
Female 2.394** -14.598** -11.762**
(0.101) (2.850) (2.850)
Male 2.41** -15.043** -4.177
(0.099) (3.094) (3.504)
Female x High School -0.151 -0.187
(0.142) (0.118)
Female x Some College -0.228 -0.299+
(0.176) (0.151)
Female x College -0.512** -0.618**
(0.180) (0.178)
Male x High School -0.157+ -0.143*
(0.089) (0.066)
Male x Some College -0.186* -0.139*
(0.080) (0.056)
Male x College -0.270* -0.225+
(0.127) (0.117)
Husband's Education YES
Wife's Education YES
Husband's Total Income 0.169**
(0.040)
Wife's Total Income -1.452**
(0.097)
Obs. 13484 13484 13484
Adj. R-sq 0.766 0.773 0.788
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
and age range dummies for spouse interacted with sex dummies in all specifications with demographics.
Robust standard errors in parentheses account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000.
MEN, CHILDREN, AND CULTURE
Table XVI
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Same x Female 0.036 0.049 0.092+
LFP 1950 (0.036) (0.049) (0.053)
Not Same x Wife's 0.072* 0.054
Female LFP 1950 (0.030) (0.035)
Not Same x Husband's 0.086** 0.076**
Female LFP 1950 (0.030) (0.028)
Same x TFR 1950 0.216** 0.214** 0.312**
(0.039) (0.044) (0.029)
Not Same x Wife's 0.179** 0.157**
TFR 1950 (0.036) (0.024)
Not Same x Husband's 0.180** 0.162**
TFR 1950 (0.042) (0.038)
High School 3.499** 3.488** 3.411** -0.461** -0.457** -0.424**
(0.581) (0.583) (0.461) (0.097) (0.100) (0.076)
Some College 5.315** 5.321** 5.211** -0.500** -0.491** -0.466**
(0.665) (0.547) (0.663) (0.099) (0.116) (0.092)
College + 9.491** 9.452** 9.343** -0.949** -0.939** -0.911**
(0.461) (0.629) (0.679) (0.124) (0.101) (0.097)
Husband -1.706* -1.740** -1.786** -0.179** -0.177* -0.155**
High School (0.709) (0.501) (0.484) (0.057) (0.074) (0.059)
Husband -1.608** -1.693** -1.723* -0.173** -0.167+ -0.153*
Some College (0.490) (0.631) (0.726) (0.051) (0.086) (0.066)
Husband -6.220** -6.264** -6.311** -0.166** -0.178* -0.154*
College + (0.451) (0.713) (0.494) (0.032) (0.088) (0.067)
Husband -4.311** -4.347** -4.352** 0.134** 0.140** 0.141**
Total Income (0.191) (0.234) (0.273) (0.024) (0.038) (0.027)
Obs. 12060 12060 12060 12060 12060 12060
Adj. R-sq 0.055 0.055 0.056 0.090 0.092 0.099
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country of own father x country of husband's father level. Income is measured in units of $10,000.
All specifications include a constant.
HIS OR HER CULTURE?
Dependent variable is Weeks Worked Dependent variable is Children
Table XVII
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viiii)
Density 0.007 0.078* -0.017 0.016 0.005 -0.047 0.021 -0.124*
(0.037) (0.034) (0.049) (0.028) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.055)
Density x Female 0.005* 0.004 0.008**
LFP 1950 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Female 0.079** 0.047* 0.047* 0.079** 0.033
LFP 1950 (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026)
High School 0.684 0.512 2.274** 2.174** 2.058**
(0.512) (0.510) (0.561) (0.564) (0.565)
Some College 0.141 -0.048 3.414** 3.291** 3.192**
(1.070) (1.097) (1.001) (1.019) (1.036)
College + 1.076+ 0.854 6.213** 6.072** 5.946**
(0.578) (0.524) (0.543) (0.508) (0.494)
Husband -1.704* -1.763* -1.836*
High School (0.751) (0.742) (0.729)
Husband -1.368+ -1.401+ -1.461+
Some College (0.822) (0.825) (0.814)
Husband -5.012** -5.057** -5.114**
College + (0.473) (0.460) (0.461)
Husband -2.859** -2.860** -2.876**
Total Income (0.309) (0.308) (0.305)
Obs. 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709
Adj. R-sq 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.023 0.024 0.052 0.053 0.053
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, WORK, AND ETHNIC DENSITY
Dependent variable is Hours Worked
Table XVIII
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Density 0.039 0.013 -0.054** 0.001 -0.056** 0.023 0.001 -0.056**
(0.030) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014)
Density x TFR 1950 0.019** 0.016** 0.016**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TFR 1950 0.228** 0.013 0.216** 0.033 0.217** 0.035
(0.060) (0.068) (0.055) (0.072) (0.056) (0.072)
High School -0.419* -0.374* -0.474** -0.395** -0.356*
(0.173) (0.167) (0.164) (0.145) (0.141)
Some College -0.503** -0.464* -0.524** -0.480** -0.447**
(0.195) (0.192) (0.181) (0.171) (0.171)
College + -0.876** -0.827** -0.928** -0.862** -0.820**
(0.201) (0.196) (0.208) (0.196) (0.193)
Husband -0.275* -0.220+ -0.201+
High School (0.121) (0.113) (0.112)
Husband -0.225* -0.187+ -0.172+
Some College (0.093) (0.101) (0.100)
Husband -0.261** -0.213** -0.203**
College + (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
Husband 0.106* 0.120* 0.125**
Total Income (0.049) (0.047) (0.046)
Obs. 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709 6709
Adj. R-sq 0.034 0.060 0.069 0.098 0.104 0.082 0.104 0.111
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. SMSA fixed effects in all specifications. Age and age squared
for wife and age range dummies for husband in all specifications with demographics. Robust standard errors in parentheses
account for clustering at country level. Income is measured in units of $10,000. All specifications include a constant.
CULTURE, CHILDREN, AND ETHNIC DENSITY
Dependent variable is Children
Table A1
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Weeks worked 15.21 20.91 0 51
Hours worked 10.19 16.31 0 66
Children 3.07 1.82 0 12
Age 35.69 3.16 30 40
High School 0.53 0.50 0 1
Some College 0.11 0.31 0 1
College + 0.08 0.28 0 1
Husband 0.35 0.48 0 1
High School
Husband 0.13 0.33 0 1
Some College
Husband 0.20 0.40 0 1
College +
Husband Age 39.00 6.00 14 100
Husband 1.13 0.68 -0.99 5
Total Income
The sample includes married women age 30-40 not living in farms or group quarters and not working in agricultural
INDIVIDUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS -- CENSUS
There are 6774 married couples in our sample. Data are from 1% 1970 Form 2 Metro Sample of the U.S. Census.
occupations whose father was born in one of the 25 countries in our sample. Income is measured in units of $10,000.
Table A2
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Full Time 0.31 0.46 0 1
Children 2.51 1.57 0 8
Age 38.20 6.49 29 50
High School 0.49 0.50 0 1
Some College 0.16 0.37 0 1
College + 0.18 0.39 0 1
Husband 0.34 0.47 0 1
High School
Husband 0.21 0.41 0 1
Some College
Husband 0.24 0.43 0 1
College +
Husband Age 40.17 8.84 19 99
Husband 3.41 2.67 -0.73 16.26
Total Income
1982. The sample includes married women age 29-50, born in US whose ancestors came from one of the 9 countries
in our sample. Income is measured in units of $10,000.
There are 456 married couples in our sample. Data are from the General Social Survey, years 1977, 1978, 1980 and
INDIVIDUAL SUMMARY STATISTICS -- GSS
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